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Broadband Internet: An Information Superhighway to Sex Crime?
* 
 
Does internet use trigger sex crime? We use unique Norwegian data on crime and internet 
adoption to shed light on this question. A public program with limited funding rolled out 
broadband access points in 2000-2008, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in 
internet use. Our instrumental variables and fixed effect estimates show that internet use is 
associated with a substantial increase in reported incidences of rape and other sex crimes. 
We present a theoretical framework that highlights three mechanisms for how internet use 
may affect reported sex crime, namely a reporting effect, a matching effect on potential 
offenders and victims, and a direct effect on crime propensity. Our results indicate that the 
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The internet is a virtual treasure trove of information, and it has enabled new
forms of social interactions through instant messaging, internet forums, and social
networking. These fundamental changes have led to a growing interest among
researchers and policymakers about the internet’s impact on society.1 In particular,
the rapid growth of broadband internet has fueled a debate about how to shape and
control this so-called superhighway to information and communication. Some have
advocated that internet traﬃc should be controlled and monitored by government,
just like conventional highway systems, while others argue for a more laissez-faire
attitude. The debate has been particularly heated when it comes to how internet use
aﬀects the prevalence of sex crimes such as rape and child sex abuse, and whether
policy interventions are called for. However, there is little if any causal evidence
on the relationship between internet use and sex crime and—as discussed in detail
below—much of what we know is either circumstantial or anecdotal.
In this paper, we use unique Norwegian data to examine the causal link between
internet use and sex crime. We begin by estimating the net impact of internet use
on rates of overall sex crime, rape and child sex abuse. As a source of exogenous
variation in internet use, we exploit a public program introduced by the Norwegian
government in the late 1990s. The program aimed at ensuring broadband internet
access at a reasonable price throughout the country. Because of limited funding,
access to broadband internet was progressively rolled out, so that the necessary
infrastructure (access points) was established in diﬀerent municipalities at diﬀerent
times.2 We use this spatial and temporal variation in the availability of broadband
internet across municipalities in an instrumental variables (IV) setup: For each
municipality and every year, we instrument the fraction of households with broadband
internet subscription with the fraction of households that are covered by broadband
infrastructure in the previous year. We show that our instrument is unrelated to
municipality characteristics such as the poverty rate, immigrant population share,
sex crime rate, and police density.
1Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) ﬁnd that media consumption on the internet is somewhat more
ideologically segregated than is consumption of traditional media, though less segregated than
face-to-face interactions. Freund and Weinhold (2004) and Choi (2003) ﬁnd that the internet has a
positive eﬀect on bilateral trade and foreign direct investment, while Yi and Choi (2005) and Choi
and Yi (2009) suggest that the internet lowers the inﬂation rate and increases economic growth.
Saint-Paul (2009) studies how internet search engines aﬀect economic growth, while George (2008)
and Ward (2007) examine how the internet aﬀects the market for daily newspapers and local music
stores, respectively.
2Throughout this paper, broadband internet is deﬁned as internet connections with download
speeds that exceeds 256 kbit/s.
2Our IV estimates show that internet use is associated with a substantial increase
in reported sex crime: Our baseline estimate suggests that in 2006 roughly one out of
eleven rapes per 100,000 inhabitants would have been avoided if broadband internet
had not been introduced. To learn about the characteristics of the complier group
for our instrument, we take advantage of survey data on individuals’ broadband
subscription and accessibility. We ﬁnd that the complier group is overrepresented
by individuals who are more likely to be sex oﬀenders, most notably young males.
Having presented our main results, we take several steps to challenge the validity of
the estimated net relationship between internet use and reported sex crime, ﬁnding
little cause for worry.
We present a simple theoretical framework that highlights three possible mecha-
nisms. First, internet use could increase reported crime without necessarily causing
an increase in actual crime rates. Although it is not possible to report crime to the
police on the internet, internet use may induce people to report crimes that they
would otherwise not report. However, we ﬁnd no evidence of changes in reported
crime relative to charges or convictions, which would be expected if marginal reports
are less strong. There are also no changes in the time elapsed between the crime and
the report, suggesting again that reporting behavior was unaﬀected.
Next, we try to distinguish between the two other mechanisms. On the one hand,
there may be a matching eﬀect where the positive relationship between internet use
and sex crime reﬂects that it is easier for sex oﬀenders to meet their potential victims
via chat rooms or other internet sites than through alternative activities. On the
other hand, internet use can have a direct eﬀect on the propensity for sex crime. In
particular, internet reduces the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of (violent and/or
extreme) pornography, which has often been linked to the propensity to commit sex
crimes (e.g. Posner, 1992; Zillman, 1971).
Our results indicate that the direct eﬀect is positive and substantial. First, we
ﬁnd no eﬀect on other types of crime, where internet use might have an indirect eﬀect
through displacing alternative activities but should have little if any direct eﬀect.
Second, we exploit that the size of the direct eﬀect is likely to vary systematically
with access to non-internet pornography. In particular, we ﬁnd a weaker eﬀect of
internet use on sex crime in municipalities close to the national border: While a legal
ban on distribution of pornography was in place and enforced in Norway, pornography
was legal and readily available in Sweden, the neighboring country. Although we
admittedly cannot rule out matching or reporting eﬀects, these results suggest that
the positive net impact of internet use on sex crime is at least in part driven by
the direct eﬀect of internet use, plausibly as a result of increased consumption of
3pornography. This is consistent with many previous laboratory studies which support
that pornography and sex crime are complements, and is in line with the well-known
feminist slogan: “Pornography is the theory, and rape is the practice” (Morgan,
1978).
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework to help
structure our discussion of previous research related to the relationship between
internet use and sex crime. Section 3 describes our data, before Section 4 describes
the expansion of broadband internet, and Section 5 discusses our empirical strategy.
Section 6 reports our main ﬁndings as well as the results from a number of robustness
checks. Section 7 investigates the alternative mechanisms through which internet
use may aﬀect reported sex crime, guided by our theoretical framework. Section 8
summarizes and concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
2 Framework and related literature
For a crime to happen, we need (at least) two individuals meeting each other. Let
λ be the rate (per year) at which people meet and N the population size. Then
M = λN is the number of matches of potential sex oﬀenders and victims. If
p = Pr(crime|match) is the probability that a match leads to a crime then the
number of committed crimes equals C = p · M, which in per capita terms is
c = p · λ
where c = C/N is the crime rate. This setup can be justiﬁed using, for example, an
underlying Poisson process where matches arrive at a given rate (Mortensen, 1988).
We are interested in how the internet user rate (per capita), i, aﬀects the crime
rate. In our data we observe reported crime rates c∗ which relate to committed crime
rates as follows
c
∗ = q · c (1)
where q = Pr(report|crime). We now discuss in turn how internet use may aﬀect p,
λ, and q.
The eﬀect of internet on crime propensity
First, internet may aﬀect the probability that a match leads to a sex crime, p.
The prime suspect here is the consumption of internet pornography, as argued, for
instance, by the US Congress in the passing of the Communications Decency Act
in 1996 and the Children’s Internet Protection Act in 2001. Indeed, pornography
4abounds on the internet, and since its early infancy distributors of pornography
have exploited internet’s ’Triple-A Engine’ eﬀect of Accessibility, Aﬀordability, and
Anonymity (Manning, 2005).3 The arrival of broadband internet further meant that
distributors could oﬀer explicit imaging of all kinds without excessive waiting times,
in particular for movies.4
Let the propensity to commit a sex crime depend on a latent risk factor ρ, such that
p = p(ρ) where ∂p/∂ρ > 0. Several theories link the consumption of pornographic
material to the risk factor ρ. One theory is that pornography increases the risk
of sex crimes because it triggers sexual arousal and aggression, degrades women
or children to objects, and aﬀects social and individual norms, i.e. ∂ρ/∂porn > 0
(see e.g. Zillman, 1971; Dworkin, 1981; Mackinnon, 1995). An alternative theory
emphasizes the potential cathartic eﬀects of pornography consumption and argues
that associated sexual relief (through masturbation) can decrease sexual aggression,
i.e. ∂ρ/∂porn < 0 (see e.g. Posner, 1992; Donnerstein et al., 1975). In either case,










Since internet reduces the pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of pornography, we
expect that ∂porn/∂i > 0. This would in turn imply that the sign of ∂p/∂i is
informative of the sign of ∂ρ/∂porn, and vice versa.
However, there is little if any evidence on ∂p/∂i, and most of what we know
about ∂ρ/∂porn is either circumstantial or anecdotal. In the ﬁeld, it has been
argued that the pervasive use of pornography among sexual oﬀenders indicates that
∂ρ/∂porn > 0 (Gebert, 2003). Perhaps the most systematic evidence comes from
psychology, where much eﬀort has been devoted to laboratory experiments that
study how subjects (typically male college students) respond to the exposure to
pornography. Though some studies ﬁnd no eﬀect or a reduction in sexual aggression
after exposure to pornography (see e.g. Zillman and Bryant, 1984), the majority
of laboratory experiments do ﬁnd that pornography increases sexual aggression, in
3See Kendall (2007) or Edelmann (2009) for detailed discussions of how (broadband) internet
facilitates distribution and consumption of pornography. In 2006, the US online adult entertainment
industry controlled about 12 % of all internet sites (Ropelato, 2006), and pocketed 2.8 billion
USD in revenue (Edelmann, 2009). Pornographic materials also abound on peer-to-peer networks,
where for a period 73 % of all movie searches were for pornographic ﬁlms on the once dominant
downloading engine Kazaa (Kendall, 2007).
4As an example, downloading a 5-minute video clip of 35MB takes about 1.5 hours on a 56 kbps
dial-up line compared to just 5 minutes on a 1 Mbps DSL broadband connection, and just seconds
on high-speed broadband connections. Edelmann (2009) reports that “[a]s of June 2008, broadband
users outnumber narrowband users 18 to 1 at sites that comScore (2008) classiﬁes as adult”.
5particular as concerns violent pornography (Donnerstein et al., 1987; Allen et al.,
1995). However, it is not clear whether this actually translates into higher crime
rates in the ﬁeld. The nature of both pornography consumption and expression of
aggression is likely to be quite diﬀerent in a controlled and supervised setting such as
a laboratory (with no possibility of sexual relief), compared to more private settings.5
The eﬀect of internet on matching
The second channel through which internet can aﬀect sex crimes is the rate at which
potential oﬀenders (men) meet victims (women), λ. It is widely documented that
uncertainty and frictions play an important role in marriage markets (Mortensen,
1988). Recent literature has emphasized the potential role of the internet in increasing
the eﬃciency of these markets. Hitsch et al. (2010) for example argue that search
frictions in online dating markets are very small, suggesting that the matching
rate depends on internet use. There are several ways in which the internet can
increase the number of matches. First, internet can reduce information constraints.
For example, dating sites allow searches based on personal characteristics such as
age, education and profession, but also on less readily observed dimensions such as
sexual preferences, hobbies and religion. Internet may also expand the choice set,
making matches available that were previously unavailable, perhaps due to a lack of
connection in traditional social networks. Finally, the anonymity that internet oﬀers
can also expand the pool of people looking for a match: Stevenson and Wolfers (2007)
cite data from Forrester Research suggesting that over a third of online personals
are placed by someone who is currently married.
At the same time, because more time spent online implies less time spent on other
activities, internet can also cause a reduction in matching due to a incapacitation
eﬀect. There is also a potential substitution eﬀect if social interaction through
internet forums and social networks leads to less direct personal interaction.
The relationship between internet use and matching is therefore ambiguous. The
relative weight of the various mechanisms will depend on the eﬃciency enhancing
eﬀect of the internet in the search process for mates, dates and friends. It will
also depend on individual preferences and characteristics of the market participants.
In light of the success of social networking, dating sites and chat rooms, there is
surprisingly little evidence on these questions. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) for
example write that ”While the Internet may yet transform marriage markets, it is
too early to assess whether those matched on the Internet are better matched than
5See for example the related discussion in Dahl and Dellavigna (2009) in the context of movie
violence, but also Levitt and List (2007a,b) more broadly on lab experiments.
6they would have been without the Internet, whether marriage rates will subsequently
rise, and what impact this will have on divorce.”
The eﬀect of internet on crime reporting
Finally, the internet may change the costs of reporting a crime and thus the reporting
rate q. Because Norwegian police do not accept online crime reports, there is no
direct link between internet use and the probability that a sex crime is reported.
However, reporting costs may decrease if information and social interaction on the
internet reduces the stigma of being the victim of a crime, for instance by increasing
awareness or facilitating contact with victims or support groups. It is therefore
possible that ∂q/∂i > 0, though we are not aware of any systematic studies of the
relationship between crime reporting and internet use.
The eﬀect of internet on reported sex crime
We can now write
c
∗(i,ρ) = q(i) · c(i,ρ) = q(i) · λ(i) · p(ρ) (2)
To see how internet use may aﬀect reported crimes, and how this relates to committed






























Equation (3) highlights that the net eﬀect of internet use on reported crime consists
of three distinct components. The ﬁrst term shows that we need to distinguish
between the eﬀect on committed crime and the eﬀect on reporting through ∂q/∂i.
The following two terms decompose the eﬀect on actual crime into two channels: the
direct eﬀect of internet use on the latent risk factor for sex crime, dρ/di, and the
eﬀect of internet on the matching of potential victims and oﬀenders, ∂λ/∂i.
3 Data
Our analysis uses several data sources, which we can link through unique identiﬁers
for each individual and every municipality.
7Crime data
Our crime data come from administrative police registers containing complete records
of (i) reported crime for each municipality over the period 1993–2008, and (ii)
individual criminal charges for every resident over the period 1993–2004. The dataset
contains all serious crimes, but also misdemeanors like drunk driving, excessive
speeding or shop lifting. A “reported crime” is deﬁned as a crime reported to or
recorded by the police. A person is registered as “charged” if, at the end of the
investigation, they are considered to be the perpetrator of a reported crime by police
and prosecutor (independent of potential indictments, prosecutions or convictions).
Statistics Norway has constructed sub-categories of crime and we rely on these
deﬁnitions to construct crime categories that correspond to those used by the US
FBI (see the appendix, Table A1).6
A problem for any empirical study of crime is the diﬃculty in measuring criminal
activity. Typically, measures are constructed from either self-reported survey data
or from registered crimes. Self-reports of criminal activity should be interpreted
cautiously since they are often impossible to validate and since there are incentives to
misreport (MacDonald, 2002; Kirk, 2006). In particular, truthful self-reporting is less
likely among subjects with an extensive criminal record compared to subjects with
little or no criminal history (Hinderlang et al., 1981). A key advantage of our register
data is that “reported crimes” are cleanly identiﬁed. In particular, our data exclude
reports that are dismissed by police and prosecutor, because they are likely to be
fraudulent or concern acts that are not criminal.7 Moreover, the register data have
the advantage that oﬀenders cannot choose not to be registered, unlike voluntary
surveys where they may decline to participate.
A disadvantage of register data is that it excludes crimes which are not reported
or not recorded by the police. Moreover, criminal charges require that the police
identiﬁes the oﬀender. In line with previous studies, our main analysis focuses
on reported crime rather than charges. This is in part because we do not have
information on criminal charges after 2004, but also because the evidential burden is
often diﬃcult in these cases; which is mirrored in the fact that only in a quarter of
cases are charges brought. Also, alleged rape oﬀenders are unidentiﬁed in about a
tenth of cases even after the investigation (Stene, 2001).
6Throughout this paper, our deﬁnition of sex crimes excludes crimes related to the distribution
of pornography. Results are unchanged when these are included in the deﬁnition of sex crimes.
7In 1997, this concerned about 9 % of reports on rape and other sexual activity, and about 7 %
on child sexual abuse (Stene, 2001).
8Internet data
Our internet data contain complete records of the fraction of households that subscribe
to or are covered by broadband internet, in every municipality over the period 2000–
2008. Throughout this paper, broadband is deﬁned as internet connections with
download speed that exceeds 256 kbit/s.
The data on broadband coverage come from the Norwegian Ministry of Govern-
ment Administration. The ministry monitors the coverage and use of broadband
internet, and the suppliers of broadband access to end-users are therefore required to
ﬁle annual reports about their coverage rates to the Norwegian Telecommunications
Authority. The coverage rates are based on information on the area signal range
of the local access points and detailed information on the place of residence of
households. In computing the coverage rates on the municipality level, it is taken
into account that multiple suppliers may provide broadband access to households
living in the same area, so that we avoid double counting.
For the years 2000 and 2001, our data on broadband subscriptions come from the
state-owned enterprise Telenor, which was the sole provider of broadband internet
during this period. For the period 2002–2008, the data on broadband subscriptions
are from the quarterly Internet Survey performed by Statistics Norway, surveying all
suppliers of broadband access to end-users. The survey contains information on the
aggregate number of households with broadband subscriptions in each municipality.
To explore the group of compliers to our instrument, we also exploit detailed
information on media use for a representative sample of individuals at age 9–79, pro-
vided by Statistics Norway’s Media User Survey. Each year, around 2700 individuals
are asked detailed questions about their media use, with a response rate above 70 %.
Importantly, the survey contains information on respondents age, sex, education,
labor market status and some household characteristics, besides their internet use
and connection speed. This survey data is available for the period 2000–2008.
Socio-demographic data
Our socio-demographic data come from administrative registers provided by Statistics
Norway. Speciﬁcally, we use a rich longitudinal database which covers every resident
from 1993 to 2008. It contains individual demographic information (sex, age, immi-
grant status, country of origin, marital status, number of children), socio-economic
data (years of education, income, employment status), and geographic identiﬁers
for municipality of residence. The information on educational attainment is based
on annual reports from Norwegian educational establishments, whereas the income
data and employment data are collected from tax records and other administrative
9registers. The household information is from the Central Population Register, which
is updated annually by the local population registries and veriﬁed by the Norwegian
Tax Authority. The coverage and reliability of Norwegian register data is considered
to be exceptional, as illustrated by the fact that they received the highest rating in a
data quality assessment conducted by Atkinson et al. (1995).
Summary statistics
In our main analysis, we use municipality-level data on crime rates, internet use
and coverage rates, and other socio-demographic variables expressed in per capita
terms. We focus on the years 2000–2008, when broadband internet coverage went
from virtually zero to almost 100 %. Table 1 displays summary statistics for the key
variables. Detailed descriptions of each of the variables are given in the appendix,
Table A1.
We use three diﬀerent outcome variables, namely reported overall sex crime,
reported rape and reported child sex abuse.8 We deﬁne the outcome variables in
terms of crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants. The ﬁrst panel of Table 1 displays the
mean of crime rates across municipalities, with standard deviations in parentheses.
Rape and child sex abuse are the two main categories of sex crimes, making up
nearly 25 and 45 % of all sex crimes, respectively. The remaining categories are, for
instance, procurement, prostitution and public exposé. It is also evident that the
rate of sex crime is fairly stable, perhaps with a weakly increasing trend over the
period. The time trend in overall crime is quite similar. Note that sex crime rates in
Norway are similar to those in comparable countries. For instance, rape rates are
almost identical to those in the UK, France and Germany, though somewhat lower
than rates in the US (32 per 100,000) and Canada (78 per 100,000).9
The second panel of Table 2 shows means and standard deviations of internet
coverage and user rates, deﬁned as shares of households in a given municipality at the
beginning of each year. We can see that there is no broadband use nor coverage in
2000. However, all households with a telephone connection would have dial-up access
to internet, but limited to a bitrate of less than 56 kbit/s. In 2008, mean broadband
coverage is as high as 98 %, whereas the mean user rate reaches almost 54 %. We
ﬁnd the largest variation in coverage rates across municipalities around 2004, while
the user rates vary the most during the last three years. Section 4 describes in detail
the spatial and temporal variation in internet use and coverage.
8Notice that prostitution (though not procurement) is legal in Norway, and is hence not included
in the crime statistics.
9Source: Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice
Systems, covering the period 1998–2000.
10The third panel of Table 1 displays a number of other socio-demographic variables,
which are deﬁned in Table A1 in the appendix. Local unemployment, poverty, urban
settlement (centrality) and immigrant population are all deﬁned in per capita terms.
Most of these variables are shown to be fairly stable over the period. There is,
however, an increase in the immigrant population share during the period. It is also
evident that unemployment in Norway remained very low compared to most other
European countries. We see that average years of education and police density were
stable over the period. It should ﬁnally be noted that the estimations below will
also control for a number of other control variables, including population shares by
age-group and gender, as well as the population shares of immigrants by age, gender,
country of origin, and refugee status (see the appendix, Table A1). For brevity, we
omit summary statistics for these variables.
4 Expansion of broadband internet
During the 1990s, many OECD countries were planning the expansion of services
related to information and communications technology. The new technology was seen
as essential for retaining competitiveness and achieving high standards of living in a
global economy. In particular, broadband internet was believed to reduce job-search
costs, increase productivity in private enterprises and enable eﬃcient provision of
public services. In Norway, this manifested itself in the National Broadband Policy
that was introduced by the Norwegian Parliament in May 1998 (St.meld.nr. 38 (1997–
1998)). There were two main goals. The ﬁrst was to ensure that every household and
private enterprise throughout the country had access to broadband at a reasonable
and uniform price. The second was to ensure that the public sector quickly adopted
broadband internet.
The Norwegian government took several steps to reach these goals. First and
foremost, it invested heavily in the necessary infrastructure. The investment in
infrastructure was largely channeled through the state-owned telecom company
Telenor, which was the sole supplier of broadband access to end-users in the early
2000s and continues to be the main supplier today. Moreover, virtually all broadband
infrastructure was, and still is, owned and operated by Telenor.
Second, local governments were required to ensure access to broadband internet
by 2005 to local public institutions, such as administrations, schools, and hospitals
(St.meld.nr. 49 (2002–2003)). To assist municipalities in rural areas, the federal
government provided ﬁnancial support through a funding program known as Høykom,
which was initiated in 1999. Local governments could receive funds from this program
11by submitting a project plan that had to be evaluated by a program board with
expert evaluations. While the criteria determining selection are somewhat unclear,
the board stated that it wanted to ensure broadband coverage throughout the country.
Once approved, ﬁnancial support was provided in the initial years of broadband
access, thus making it possible for public institutions to cover relatively high initial
costs (Hansteen, 2005; Statskonsult, 2007).10
The transmission of broadband signals through ﬁber-optic cables required instal-
lation of local access points. Over the period 2000–2008, such access points were
progressively rolled out, generating considerable spatial and temporal variation in
broadband coverage. The staged implementation of broadband was in part due to
limited public funding, but also because Norway is a large and sparsely populated
country. There are often long driving distances between the populated areas, which
are mostly far apart or partitioned by mountains or the fjord-gashed shoreline.11
Figure 2a displays the overall mean broadband coverage rate and the distribution
of broadband coverage rates across municipalities at the start of each year between
2000 and 2008. There is considerable variation, both across municipalities and
over time. In particular, the requirement of broadband internet access to public
institution seems to have spilled over into increased coverage among households.
This is mirrored by an increase in the average coverage rate from around 25 % in
2003 to more than 85 % by 2006.
By December 2000, broadband transmission centrals were installed in the cities of
Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim and Tromsø, as well as in a few neighboring municipalities
of Oslo and Trondheim. However, less than one-third of the households were covered
by a broadband service provider in each of these municipalities. Figure 1 shows
geographic diﬀerences in the broadband coverage rates across municipalities between
2003 and 2006. The maps illustrate that for a large number of municipalities there
was no broadband coverage at all before 2004, whereas most municipalities had
achieved fairly high coverage rates after 2006. Moreover, there is considerable
variation in coverage rates within the municipalities in these years. We ﬁnd the
10During the period 1999–2005, the Høykom program received more than 1000 such applications
and co-funded nearly 400 projects, allocating a total of 50 million Euros (NOK 400 million), provided
initially by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. From 2002, the Ministry of Education and Research
co-ﬁnanced another scheme Høykom skole dedicated to the education segment within the scope
of the earlier program, as it opened for ﬁnancial support for broadband infrastructure in public
schools. There are virtually no private schools in Norway.
11The Norwegian territory covers about 149,400 square miles, equivalent to the area of the US
states of Delaware, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia and
West Virginia combined. The country is dominated by mountainous or high terrain, as well as a
rugged coastline stretching about 2,650 kilometers, broken by numerous fjords and thousands of
island (making the coastline approximately 10 times longer if the length of the fjords were included).
12largest dispersion in coverage rates across municipalities between 2004 and 2005.
While almost complete broadband coverage was reached by 2008, more than 50 % of
households in nearly all municipalities were covered by a broadband provider two
years earlier.
Figure 2b displays the distribution and averages of broadband user rates across
municipalities between 2000 and 2008. Broadband use increases over time, with most
of the increase taking place after 2003, and reaching an average user rate around
55 % by 2008. We ﬁnd that there was a substantial increase in broadband use after
the initial expansion of broadband coverage. Moreover, there was a considerable
increase in broadband use also after 2006, even though there was less of an increase
in broadband coverage in these later years.
5 Empirical strategy
We employ two approaches to estimate the net eﬀect of internet use on sex crime.
Our ﬁrst approach is a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, controlling for permanent diﬀerences
in crime rates between municipalities, as well as for common time-speciﬁc changes in
crime rates. Our second approach implements an IV-strategy with two-stage least
squares, using the spatial and temporal variation in the availability of broadband
internet across municipalities to instrument for internet use.
Our empirical approaches are summarized by the following two equations.
c
∗
kt = δikt + x
0
ktβ + αk + τt + kt (4)
ikt = φzkt−1 + x
0
ktλ + γk + θt + ηkt (5)
where c∗ is the reported sex crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants, i is the fraction of
households with broadband internet subscriptions (at the beginning of the year), z is
the fraction of households with access to broadband internet (at the beginning of the
year), and x is a set of time-varying covariates (measured at the municipality level in
per capita terms). In all cases, the subscript k denotes municipality and the subscript
t denotes year. Both equations include a full set of municipality indicators and year
indicators. In our main analysis, the sample consists of all municipalities over the
period 2000–2008. The standard errors are always clustered at the municipality level
and robust to heteroskedasticity.
The ﬁxed eﬀect approach is given by equation (4), and can be interpreted as
giving a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of internet use on sex crime:
Unobservable determinants of crime that are ﬁxed at the municipality level will be
controlled for through the municipality indicators αk, just like common time shocks
13are absorbed by the year indicators τt. In the IV-approach, equation (5) is the ﬁrst
stage and equation (4) is the second stage.
In both approaches, we report results with and without a large set of time-varying
socio-demographic controls x, to check that the estimated eﬀect is not driven by
time-varying observable factors. For example, younger individuals are more likely to
use internet and are also more often involved in a sex crime. If some municipalities
experience growth in the number of young inhabitants, then this could increase both
internet use and sex crimes, which would bias the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates. We therefore
include detailed controls for demographic characteristics. The control variables are
listed in Table A1, and include population shares by age-group, gender and immigrant
status, as well as centrality of residence, education level, income level, poverty rate,
and unemployment rate.12 Another concern is that public funding to broadband
infrastructure across municipalities might be correlated with the amount of resources
allocated to the police, which could bias our estimates. This concern is addressed
by including the number of police oﬃcers per capita as a control variable. Finally,
there may be some underlying trend in crime that is correlated with the expansion
of broadband internet. To address this concern, we also add the total crime rate
(excluding sex crimes) at the start of the year as a control variable.13
Despite the fact that Norway has a homogeneous population with a uniﬁed legal
system and law enforcement practices across the country, the identifying assumption
in the ﬁxed eﬀect approach of a common underlying time trend in sex crime between
municipalities might be too strong. On the one hand, individuals who are more likely
to commit a sex crime may also be more likely to use the internet, because they want
to consume internet pornography. This will generate upward bias in the ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates. On the other hand, potential sex oﬀenders may be more likely to use
internet, to seek sexual relief through pornography, in areas where there are fewer
potential victims or more strict policing. This may lead to a downward bias in the
ﬁxed eﬀect estimates. These examples illustrate that the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates may
suﬀer from omitted variables bias, but also that the direction of the bias is unclear.
Although our vector of controls x should take into account some of the confounding
factors, it is widely documented that observables explain only a small portion of
the observed variation in crime (Glaeser et al., 1996). Randomizing internet use is
not feasible in our application: We cannot in practice force internet use onto people.
12We allow for a ﬂexible functional form by including a large set of dummies for diﬀerent values
of the controls listed in Table A1.
13Note that police resources and other reported crime are potentially endogenous to sex crimes.
It is therefore useful to include them separately, and comforting to note that estimates barely move
when they are included.
14One can, however, think of a social experiment which randomizes internet access
at the municipality level. The randomization breaks the correlation between access
and unobserved determinants of crime. On the one hand, comparing crime rates
between municipalities with and without internet access would give the eﬀect of
internet access on crime. On the other hand, comparing internet use between these
municipalities, would give the eﬀect of internet access on internet use. Taking the
ratio between the two would give an IV estimate of internet use on crime, using
random access to internet as an instrumental variable.
The intention of our IV-approach is to mimic this hypothethical experiment.
Our source of exogenous variation comes from the staged installation of broadband
infrastructure, generating spatial and temporal variation in broadband coverage rates.
Section 4 describes this plausibly exogenous supply shock. For each municipality and
every year, we instrument ikt, the fraction of households with broadband internet
subscriptions, using zk,t−1, the fraction of households that are covered by broadband
infrastructure in the previous year. This IV-approach may then identify the average
eﬀect of internet use on sex crime for the sub-population that is induced to use
internet because of the increase in coverage in the previous year. Following Imbens
and Angrist (1994), we refer to this sub-population as compliers, and to the IV
estimate as the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE).
Because we control for municipality ﬁxed eﬀects and time-varying observables, it
is not necessary that the timing of the internet expansion is unrelated to municipality
characteristics. It is useful, however, to understand the determinants of the timing
of the expansion across municipalities. To examine this issue further, we estimate
the following equation
∆zkt = γk + [θt × mk,2000]
0 ψt + χkt (6)
where ∆zkt = zkt − zkt−1 and mk,2000 includes municipality-level information from
year 2000 on average years of education, unemployment rate, poverty rate, number
of policemen per capita, immigrant population share, share of population residing
in a densely populated locality (a centrality indicator), baseline sex crime rate, and
industry composition.
Figure 3 plots the estimated coeﬃcients from the vector ψt for every t (and the
associated 95 % conﬁdence intervals). Consistent with the discussion in Section
4, our results indicate that broadband expansion is positively related to centrality,
educational attainment and population size until the beginning of 2003. From 2004
onwards, there appears to be no systematic relationship between the timing of the
broadband expansion and these variables. But more importantly, the timing of
15the expansion does not seem to be correlated with background variables such as
immigrant population share, local unemployment rate, poverty rate, police density,
or (baseline) sex crime. Although it is reassuring that the broadband internet
expansion is uncorrelated with such risk factors of sex crime, we cannot rule out
that our instrument is correlated with time-varying unobservable determinants of
sex crime which would bias our IV estimates. To further increase our conﬁdence in
the IV-approach, we therefore run several speciﬁcation checks.
6 Net eﬀect of internet use on sex crime
Below, we begin by reporting estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀect model, before turning
attention to the IV estimates. Next, we take advantage of survey data on individuals’
broadband subscription and accessibility, to learn about the characteristics of the
complier group for our instrument. This allows us to better interpret the IV estimates,
and compare them to the ﬁxed eﬀect results. We then consider the economic
signiﬁcance of our estimates by comparing the actual crime rate to the estimated
counterfactual crime rate in the absence of the expansion of broadband internet.
Next, we demonstrate that our results are supported by a number of speciﬁcation
checks. We conclude this section with a comparison between our analysis and a
related study by Kendall (2007).
Fixed eﬀect estimates
Table 2 displays the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates from equation (4) per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. The ﬁrst column shows the results from a speciﬁca-
tion with only municipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst row suggests that when
the internet user rate increases by 1 percentage point, the overall crime rate increases
on average by 0.47 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. The next two rows report the
estimates for rape and child sex abuse. We see that a 1 percentage point increase in
internet use is associated with an increase in rapes of 0.14 and an increase in child
sex abuse of 0.16, per 100,000 inhabitants. The eﬀects on the overall sex crime rate
and rapes are precisely estimated, being statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 %-level.
We then add control variables to see whether the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates are
biased because of omitted time-varying observable factors. The second column adds
demographic controls to the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation. The estimated eﬀects are very
similar and probably reﬂects the homogeneous Norwegian population. A second
potential threat to the estimates are changes in the costs of committing crimes that
are correlated with internet use. It is therefore reassuring to see that our estimates
16barely move when adding a control for the number of policemen per capita in the
municipality. A third worry is that there is some underlying trend in crime that is
correlated with internet use. To address this concern, the last column of Table 2 also
adds the total crime rate (excluding sex crimes) as a control. Again the estimates
barely move.
IV estimates
The ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation provides consistent estimates of the net relationship
between internet use and sex crime, insofar as the systematic unobserved determinants
of internet use are additive, time-invariant municipality characteristics. Our IV
strategy relaxes this assumption by exploiting a plausibly exogenous supply shock to
instrument for internet use. Table 3 reports results from the IV-approach given by
equations (4) and (5). The ﬁrst column shows the estimates from the speciﬁcation
with only municipality ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies. The ﬁrst stage instruments
the user rate in a municipality in year t with the coverage rate at the start of the
year. The ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient on the coverage rate is about 0.13 which is also the
size of the complier group since the instrument ranges from 0 (nobody covered) to
1 (everybody covered). It implies that a 10 percentage point increase in internet
coverage induces (an additional) 1.3 % of the population to use internet within the
next year. The ﬁrst stage is strong, with an F-statistic around 323, which means
weak instrument bias is not a concern.
Turning to the second stage results in the ﬁrst column we see that when the
internet user rate increases by 1 percentage point, the overall crime rate increases
on average by 1.15 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. The next two rows report the
IV-estimates for rape and child sex abuse. We ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point increase
in internet use causes an increase in rapes of 0.38 and an increase in child sex abuse
of 0.62, per 100,000 inhabitants.
We include control variables to see to what extent the IV-estimates of internet
use on sex crime are sensitive to the inclusion of time-varying observable factors.
We ﬁrst add demographic controls in the second column which does not aﬀect the
ﬁrst stage estimate, nor the estimated eﬀects on overall sex crime rate and rapes.
Only the eﬀect of internet use on child sex abuse drops by about 30 % but remains
substantial, although it is no longer signiﬁcant at the 10 %-level. The ﬁnal two
columns add controls for police density and other types of crime, which barely moves
our estimates.
17Fixed eﬀect vs. IV estimates
There are at least two reasons why the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates and the IV estimates can
diﬀer. First, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates are more likely to suﬀer from omitted variable
bias. Second, ﬁxed eﬀect estimates that are not biased will be closer to average
eﬀects for the population at large, whereas the IV estimates should be interpreted as
the LATE for the subgroup of compliers who were induced to use internet because
of the increase in coverage in the previous year.14
To learn about the characteristics of the complier group, we use our survey data
on individual’s internet use in the period 2000–2008 to estimate the ﬁrst stage of
the IV for diﬀerent gender–age groups. These estimates are shown in the second
column of Table 4. We see that the expansion of broadband internet has a stronger
eﬀect on the young than the old, and that eﬀects are also stronger among males
than among females. The proportion of the compliers in a given gender–age group
are then calculated as the ratio of the ﬁrst stage for that subgroup to the overall
ﬁrst stage, multiplied by the proportion of the population in the gender–age group
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Column 1 displays the proportion of the population in
each gender–age group, wheras column 3 shows the distribution of the compliers by
gender and age. Column 4 displays the relative likelihood of an individual belonging
to a particular gender–age group, in the complier group compared to the population
at large. While 29 % of the population are males aged 16–44, more than 43 % of
the compliers are males in this age-group. When including females, around 82 %
of the compliers are aged 16–44, compared to just 57 % in the population at large.
We also see that males are overrepresented among the compliers in every age group
compared to the population at large.
Finally, columns 5–7 of Table 4 report the probability of being charged with a
sex crime for the diﬀerent gender–age groups. While sex crimes are almost uniquely
committed by males, young males are much more likely to be oﬀenders than older
males. Males aged 16–24 are for instance more than twice as likely to be charged
with a sex crime than men aged 45–66. We calculate re-weighted sex crime rates to
get a rough idea of the extent to which the IV estimates are driven by the diﬀerent
gender-age composition of the complier group. We simply take the weighted average
of the sex crime probabilities by gender-age group using the complier shares as
weights. We ﬁnd that the re-weighted sex crime rate is 60% higher than the actual
crime rate in the population at large. It should therefore not be surprising to ﬁnd
14A third possible explanation is that measurement error in the user rate creates attenuation bias
in the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates. In comparison, the IV estimates will not be prone to such attenuation
bias, as it uses only the variation in internet use that is induced by the change in coverage rates.
18that the LATE estimated in our IV-approach is larger than the estimates from the
ﬁxed eﬀect approach.
Economic signiﬁcance
To put the size of our IV estimates into perspective, we calculate the counterfactual
sex crime rate that would have occured in the absence of the expansion of broadband
internet. The counterfactual sex crime rate is given by the actual crime minus the
predicted eﬀect of internet use on sex crime for the compliers. In each year, the
predicted eﬀect of internet use on sex crime is calculated as the percentage point
increase in the coverage rate in the previous year multiplied by the ﬁrst stage times
the LATE (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Figure 4 shows the actual time trends for our various outcomes, and the predicted
counterfactual time trends based on our baseline IV estimates, reported in column
4 of Table 3. Panel (a) reports these for all sex crimes, whereas panels (b) and
(c) focus on rape and child sex abuse. Until 2003, the actual and counterfactual
trends coincide because of very low increases in coverage. From 2003, the coverage
rates quickly increased. We then see a substantial diﬀerence between the actual
and counterfactual sex crime rates. The diﬀerence peaks in 2006, when we estimate
that roughly three out of 50 sex crimes per 100,000 inhabitants would have been
avoided if broadband internet had not been introduced. Our analysis also suggests
that internet use in 2006 explains about one out of eleven rapes and one out of 22
child sex abuses, per 100,000 inhabitants.
Speciﬁcation checks
We just saw that our estimates are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls.
We now report results from additional speciﬁcation checks to further increase our
conﬁdence in the IV-results. An important requirement for our IV-approach to be
valid is that the expansion of broadband internet is unrelated to diﬀerent underlying
time trends in sex crime across municipalities. As a ﬁrst check for this possibility
we estimate municipality-speciﬁc trends using data covering the period prior to the
internet expansion, namely 1993–2000. For each municipality we obtain a slope
estimate ˆ νk. We then extrapolate pre-expansion time trends in our speciﬁcation
(both the ﬁrst and the second stage) as follows
c
∗
kt = δikt + x
0
ktβ + αk + λ1ˆ νkt + λ2ˆ νkt
2 + τt + kt (7)
19which will take into account any variation in our instrument that coincides with
pre-existing trends in the outcome. Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 report the
estimates based on these speciﬁcations, which are nearly identical to our baseline
estimates.
A second and related test follows Duﬂo (2001) in interacting baseline (year 2000)
covariates either with a linear time trend
c
∗
kt = δikt + x
0
ktβ + αk + t
P
jλjx(k,2000),j + τt + kt (8)
or with time dummies
c
∗
kt = δikt + x
0
ktβ + αk + τt
P
jλjx(k,2000),j + kt (9)
In doing so, we allow the expansion of broadband internet to be related to diﬀerent
underlying time trends in sex crime across municipalities, depending on their pre-
reform characteristics. The ﬁnal two columns in Table 3 report the estimates based
on equations (8) and (9). Again we ﬁnd that these are close to our baseline estimates;
if anything, the robustness check of interacting the covariates with time dummies
indicate that the baseline IV speciﬁcation understates the positive eﬀect of internet
use on sex crime.
We have also performed two placebo tests. The ﬁrst replaces current crime rates
and control variables with the same variables from eight years before, while main-
taining current internet use and coverage. In doing so, this pre-reform placebo test
places the internet expansion in the period before the actual roll-out. Since there was
no broadband internet expansion during the period 1993–2000, signiﬁcant estimates
would suggest that the instrument is correlated with underlying municipality-speciﬁc
trends in sex crime. Table 5 reports the results using these pre-reform outcomes.
First note that, as expected, the ﬁrst stage is very similar, changing only slightly
because of the time shift of the regressors. More importantly, in none of the three
second stages do we ﬁnd an impact of internet use on sex crime. This reinforces our
conﬁdence that we are indeed estimating the eﬀect of internet use in Table 3, and
are not picking up diﬀerential secular trends in sex crime.
The second placebo test examines whether next year’s internet use aﬀects current
sex crimes: If it did, this would suggest that there was some omitted variable causing
both sex crimes and internet use. We regress the sex crime rate in year t on internet
use in the following year t + 1, and instrument internet use in year t + 1 with the
coverage rate in year t. We control for the coverage rate in year t − 1, our original
instrument, to ensure that we are indeed estimating the eﬀect of next year’s internet
20use through future variation in our instrument.15 The ﬁnal column of Table 5 shows
the estimates from this placebo test. It is reassuring to ﬁnd that next year’s internet
use does not aﬀect the rates of overall sex crimes, rape or child sex abuse.
In addition, in Table A2 in the appendix, we make sure that our estimates are
not driven by observations with extreme values for sex crimes or zeros. Furthermore,
we examine whether our results are driven by secular changes between urban and
rural areas that may have coincided with the internet expansion. This may also be a
concern since we found in Figure 3 that broadband internet arrived earlier in more
central and larger municipalities. When we drop the ﬁve large cities from our analysis
(Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Kristiansand), the estimates barely move.
Finally, we check whether our estimates are aﬀected by spillovers or sorting. In
our analysis, crime is measured at the municipality level. This will give consistent
estimates as long as crimes are committed in the same municipality where internet
is used. In principle, crimes could be committed in, for example, neighboring
municipalities. This would probably lead to a downward bias. To check for such
spillovers we broaden our outcome measure to include sex crimes that are committed
in adjacent municipalities, while controlling for the broadband internet expansion
there. Column (5) in Table A2 in the appendix reports the resulting estimates which
are very close to our baseline.
Sorting across municipalities could also aﬀect the interpretation of our results.
In theory, individuals at risk for committing sex crimes may move to municipalities
that expand broadband internet. However, the information requirements to generate
such behavior are probably high, since people would need information on the exact
timing of the infrastructure expansion. Moreover, the cost of moving is probably
high relative to the beneﬁts, since broadband internet becomes available across the
country after a few years, making the beneﬁts short-lived. We nevertheless check
whether our instrument correlates with movements into and out of the municipality,
by estimating equation 5 with population growth (in percent) as the dependent
variable. We estimated this eﬀect for the population at large and separately for
younger men and women who are overrepresented in the complier group. The results
are shown in Table A3, and conﬁrm that confounding eﬀects due to sorting are
unlikely to be a concern.
15Since the coverage rate is cumulative, not controlling for coverage rates in the previous year
would raise the concern that we are incorporating variation that precedes the sex crime rate. It
turns out, however, that the estimates without the control for coverage rates in the previous year
are very similar and never statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic never exceeds 1).
21Discussion
Closely related to our paper is the study by Kendall (2007). Using US state-level
panel data from 1998–2003, he regresses the fraction of households with an internet
subscription on rape incidences. In contrast to our ﬁndings, Kendall reports a
negative association between internet use and rape. Our study diﬀers from Kendall’s
in a number of respects. First of all, several features of the Norwegian setting
make it possible to arrive at estimates that are potentially less biased. Unlike
the US, Norway has a homogeneous population spread out over more than 400
geographically distinct municipalities. Importantly, the municipalities are subject
to a common institutional and judicial infrastructure, and they have very similar
spending on local public services.16 The legal system and law, including criminal
law, are determined nationally, and the 27 police districts and 67 district courts do
not in general share borders with a municipality. Budgetary, administrative and
strategic responsibility for the police and the courts rest nationally with the Police
Directorate, the National Courts Administration, and the Ministry of Justice and
Police. Second, while Kendall’s ﬁxed eﬀect identiﬁcation assumes that the systematic
determinants of internet use are additive, time-invariant state characteristics, we
relax this assumption by exploiting plausibly exogenous supply shocks to instrument
for internet use.
It should ﬁnally be noted that the arrival of the internet most likely implied a
much stronger shock to the availability of pornography in Norway compared to the
US. While pornography was de facto legalized and readily available in most of the
US, a legal ban on pornography was in place in Norway. Access to pornography
was therefore severely limited in Norway before the arrival of broadband internet,
especially with respect to movies and other moving images. Hence, even in the
absence of omitted variable bias, there could be diﬀerences between our estimates
and those of Kendall.
7 Mechanisms
We have established that internet use increases reported sex crimes. This section
explores the three mechanisms highlighted in Section 2, related to reporting, matching
of potential oﬀenders and victims, and the latent risk factor for sex crime.
16There are strict national provisions for minimum standards of diﬀerent local public services,
and considerable ear-marked grants-in-aid from the central government. The national government
also determines the tax rate (except for an optional residential tax capped at 1 %) and the tax
base of the income tax. Also, the national government uses equalization transfers to redistribute
income from rich to poor municipalities, such that local diﬀerences in revenues are largely oﬀset
(Løken, 2009).
22Reporting behavior
The ﬁrst possible mechanism is that internet use increases crime reporting without
having caused an increase in the underlying crime rates. To investigate this possibility
we start by considering charges brought by police and prosecutor, relative to reported
crimes. Though it is not possible to report crime to the police on the internet in
Norway, internet use may induce people to report crimes that they would otherwise
not have reported, for example by creating contact points with victims groups. We
expect that, everything else equal, crimes are more likely to be reported the more
likely it is that charges will be made. If internet use caused an increase in reporting,
then the marginal reports would probably be weaker on average. This would lead to
a drop in the ratio of charges to reports as internet became more common. Figure 5
shows that on the contrary charges-to-reports ratios are quite stable between 1993
and 2004 (the last year for which we have data on charges) for sex crimes, rapes
and child sexual abuse alike, giving no indication of an increase in the number of
reports. To strengthen this result we also estimated the eﬀect of internet use on
the charges-to-reports ratio using our IV-approach, including all controls. Table 7
reports the estimates for the diﬀerent types of sex crimes, and in line with Figure 5,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects. We have also estimated the eﬀect of internet use on
conviction rates relative to reported crime rates for the years 2000–2004, and found
no evidence of an eﬀect.
We next consider the time from the reported crime was (allegedly) committed
to the time of the report itself. Changes in the timing of reports relative to the
crime would suggest changes in reporting behavior that could in principle also have
an eﬀect on the likelihood of charges. For instance, if the crime is more recent at
the time of the report, then witnesses and other evidence may be more forthcoming.
Such changes in reporting may not be reﬂected in Figure 5. Information on time
to report is also available for a longer time period (2001–2008) than information on
charges (2001–2004). We again use our IV-approach to estimate the eﬀect of internet
use on the time between the crime and the report (measured in days). Again these
estimates, reported in Table 7, reveal no evidence of changes in reporting behavior.
Direct and indirect eﬀect of internet use
Although we do not ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect of internet use on reporting, we still
want to distinguish whether our estimated eﬀects are driven by an indirect eﬀect
increasing the likelihood of matches (∂λ/∂i), or by a direct eﬀect on the risk factor
for sex crime itself (∂ρ/∂i). A ﬁrst check considers the eﬀect of internet on crimes
other than sex crimes. This would consist of only the indirect matching eﬀect under
23the assumption that for these crimes the latent crime factor is not aﬀected by internet
(i.e. ∂ρ/∂i = 0). As argued above, the indirect eﬀect could arise if internet use
displaces alternative activities (both during and after use) that are more or less
associated sex crime.17 For instance, if activities on the internet imply that people
stay more at home, then this is likely to aﬀect all crimes, not only sex crimes. We
perform this check for all crimes (excluding sex crimes) as well as for the types of
crime that are the most highly correlated with sex crime over time. Table A1 reports
the results, suggesting that internet has no eﬀect on non-sex crime.
A second test exploits that the eﬀect of internet use is likely to vary systematically
with access to non-internet pornography. With easier prior access to pornography,
the eﬀect of internet on the latent risk factor, ∂ρ/∂i, should be smaller. This suggests
that the total eﬀect will be mostly driven by the indirect eﬀect in areas where the
supply shock is small, while the direct eﬀect will be more important in areas where
the supply shock is large. Municipalities on the border with Sweden could more easily
take advantage of the liberal laws governing pornography in this country. Meanwhile,
there is no reason to believe that there should be systematic diﬀerences in the eﬀect
through matching between border and non-border areas. The diﬀerence in the eﬀect
of internet use between these two areas should therefore reﬂect an eﬀect on the
propensity for sex crime, not matching. Results from separate estimations using our
ﬁxed eﬀect approach and our IV-approach are reported in Table 8. The eﬀects of
internet use on sex crime are weaker in border areas than in non-border areas. While
eﬀects compared to our baseline estimates are somewhat larger in non-border areas,
they are cut almost in half in border areas. This suggests that the direct eﬀect on
crime propensity, dρ/di, is (a) an important factor behind our results, and (b) that
the direct eﬀect is positive, in line with the results from the experimental psychology
literature discussed in Section 2.
8 Conclusion
Does internet use trigger sex crime? We use Norwegian registry data on crime and
internet adoption to shed light on this question. A public program with limited
funding rolled out broadband access points in 2000–2008, and provides plausibly
exogenous variation in internet use. Our IV and ﬁxed eﬀect estimates suggest that
internet use is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in reported incidences of rape
and other sex crimes. We present a theoretical framework that highlights three
17Dahl and Lochner (2009) ﬁnd that violent crime decreases on days with larger theater audiences
for violent movies. This ﬁnding is partly due to voluntary incapacitation during movie attendance,
but also because of a substitution away from dangerous activities after movie attendance.
24mechanisms for how internet use may aﬀect reported sex crime, namely a reporting
eﬀect, a matching eﬀect on potential oﬀenders and victims, and a direct eﬀect on
crime propensity. Our results suggest that the direct eﬀect is positive and empirically
important, plausibly as a result of increased consumption of pornography.
Our study speaks to an ongoing policy debate in many countries about whether
and how internet traﬃc, with the abundant online supply of extreme pornography,
should be controlled and monitored by government to prevent sex crime, such as rape
and child sex abuse. In 1996, the US congress passed the Communications Decency
Act in an eﬀort to regulate pornographic material on the Internet, while the Children’s
Internet Protection Act was passed in 2001. In 2005, the US Attorney General formed
the Obscenity Prosecution Task Force to pursue in particular producers of extreme
pornography. The task force has since successfully litigated cases against publishers
of extreme pornography, for instance the 2008 case against Paul Little who was
sentenced to 46 months in prison and a $1.4 million ﬁne for distribution of obscene
material. The opposition to pornography is hardly restricted to the US. In China,
internet pornography was banned in 2002, and the production of pornographic movies
was banned in 2008. While possession of pornography may give prison terms up to 3
years long, large distributors of pornography may face execution.
While one could argue that our ﬁndings support censorship or regulation of
internet pornography because of its harms to third parties, caution is in order.
Though our results suggest that internet use increases the propensity for sex crime,
matching eﬀects may also be important. From a policy perspective, it is critical to pin
down the exact channel: If the matching eﬀects are important, then an appropriate
policy response may rather be to improve transparency and inform about the dangers
on internet forums and social networking sites.
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Figure 2. Internet user and coverage rates, averages and distribution across
municipalities, 2000–2008
Note: Figures show the overall mean and distribution of broadband user rates (panel a) and coverage
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Figure 3. Broadband expansion regressed on baseline municipality characteristics,
2000–2008
Note: We regress changes in coverages rates on municipality speciﬁc baseline characteristics
interacted with time dummies, controlling for municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁgures plot interaction
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Figure 4. Actual and predicted time trends
Note: Solid line = actual crime rate. Dashed line = counterfactual crime rate in the case of no
broadband expansion. Shaded area = 95% conﬁdence intervals for the counterfactual crime rate.
The counterfactual crime rate is given by the actual crime rate minus the predicted eﬀect of internet
use on crime. In each year, the predicted eﬀect of internet use on crime is calculated as the increase


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
All sex crimes Rape
Child sex abuse
Ratio of charges to reported crimes
Figure 5. Ratio of charges to reported crimes, 1993-2004
Note: Charges/Crimes = # reported crimes that led to a criminal charge / # reported crimes.
Table 2. Fixed eﬀect estimates of internet use on sex crime
All sex crimes 0.466** 0.549*** 0.546** 0.570***
(0.197) (0.212) (0.212) (0.210)
Rape 0.141** 0.127* 0.127* 0.130*
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Child sex abuse 0.158 0.180 0.180 0.193
(0.134) (0.147) (0.147) (0.145)
Demographic controls X X X
Police density X X
Other crimes X
Note: Crime rates are calculated per 100,000 persons. Eﬀects are reported per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the municipality level. Regressions are based on 422 municipalities × 8 years = 3376 observations.
All regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. Detailed descriptions of control






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 5. Placebo tests
Baseline Pre-reform Next year
outcomes usage
All sex crimes 1.217** −0.682 −0.543
(0.533) (0.582) (1.263)
Rapes 0.401** −0.112 −0.158
(0.164) (0.152) (0.532)







Note: Crime rates are calculated per 100,000 persons. Eﬀects are reported per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. Regressions are based on 422 municipalities × 8 years = 3376
observations. For the baseline estimations we use data on reported crimes over the period 2001–2008.
In column (2) we display results from regressions where we use data on reported crimes and controls
from the pre-broadband expansion period 1993–2000, while broadband user rates and coverage
rates are stll from the period 2001–2008. In column (3) we display results from regressions where
we instrument user rate in year t+1 by coverage rate in year t, while controlling for coverage rates
at t-1. All regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies and all controls listed in
Table A1. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. *
p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 6. Alternative outcomes
Overall crime Vandalism Theft
Eﬀect of internet use −4.221 −0.082 −3.720
(9.816) (1.336) (6.066)
Dependent mean 4933.8 333.4 2192.4
Note: Crime rates are calculated per 100,000 persons. Eﬀects are reported per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the municipality level. Regressions are based on 422 municipalities × 8 years = 3376 observations.
All regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies and all controls listed in Table A1.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
37Table 7. Eﬀect of internet use on reporting
Charges/Crimes Time to report (days)
Dep. mean Eﬀect Dep. mean Eﬀect
All sex crimes 0.412 −0.0008 213.8 −2.92
(0.0098) (3.13)
Rape 0.206 −0.0154 80.9 0.96
(0.0133) (2.22)
Child sex abuse 0.503 0.0074 240.6 5.26
(0.0135) (4.04)
Note: Crime rates are calculated per 100,000 persons. Eﬀects are reported per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. Charges/Crimes = # reported crimes that led to a criminal
charge / # reported crimes. N = 422 municipalities × 4 years (2001-04) = 1688. Time to report =
days between the date when crime was reported to the police and the date when the crime was
allegedly committed (annual average at the municipality level). N = 422 municipalities × 8 years
(2001-08) = 3376. All regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies and all controls
listed in Table A1. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality
level. * p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 8. Border areas
Border areas Non-border areas










Note: Crime rates are calculated per 100,000 persons. Eﬀects are reported per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. Following Beatty et al. (2009), we deﬁne municipalities close
to Sweden as border areas, whereas the remaining 260 municipalities are grouped as non-border
areas. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. All
regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies and all controls listed in Table A1. * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
38A Additional results
Table A1. Variable deﬁnitions
Variable Description
Sex crimes
All sex crimes The number of reported alleged sexual abuses mentioned in the
Norwegian Penal Code $$191-203, including rape, attempted rape,
sexual abuse of children, incest, procurement, prostitution, public
exposé, and various other unapproved sexual abuses, committed in
year t in a given municipality, divided by the population size of the
municipality and multiplied by 100,000.
Rapes The number of reported rapes and attempted rapes as deﬁned in
the Norwegian Penal Code §192 that were allegedly committed in
year t in a given municipality, divided by the population size of the
municipality and multiplied by 100,000.
Child abuses The number of reported sexual abuse of children under 10, 14 or 16
years of age as deﬁned in the Norwegian Penal Code §§195-7 and §
200 that were allegedly committed in year t in a given municipality,




User rate t Fraction of households residing in a given municipality who have a
paid broadband internet subscription, with access speed at or
above 256 kilobits per second at the beginning of year t.
Coverage rate t Fraction of households residing in a given municipality who are
being covered by a broadband internet provider, with access speed
at or above 256 kilobits per second at the beginning of year t.
Demographic
controls
Age-group Percentage shares of the population residing in a given municipality
belonging to the age-groups 16-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-66,
and 67 or above at the beginning of year t.
39Variable Description
Sex Percentage shares of the female population residing in a given
municipality belonging to the age-groups 16-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-66, and 67 or above at the beginning of year t.
Immigrants Percentage shares of the immigrant, male-immigrant, non-western
immigrant, non-western male-immigrant, refugee and male-refugee
populations residing in a given municipality belonging to the
age-groups 16-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-66, and 67 or above
at the beginning of year t.
Urban
settlement
Percentage share of the population in a given municipality residing
in a densely populated locality at the beginning of year t.
Education Average years of education among the age-group 16-59 residing in a
given municipality at the beginning of year t.
Income Average after-tax disposable income earned during year t by
individuals aged 16-59 years residing in a given municipality.
Poverty Percentage share of population having income below half of the
median equivalent after-tax income in a given municipality, when
the equivalent income is calculated using the OECD equivalence
scale.
Unemployment Percentage share of the population aged 16-59 residing in a given
municipality that is registered as fully unemployed at beginning of
year t.
Police density Number of policemen in service in a given municipality at the
beginning of year t, divided by the population size of the




The total number of reported crimes (excluding sex crimes)
allegedly committed in year t in a given municipality, divided by
the population size of the municipality and multiplied by 100,000.
Theft The total number of thefts, including burglary (§ 147), larceny-theft
(§ 257, §§ 261-262, § 258) and motor vehicle theft (§ 260) as deﬁned
in the Norwegian Penal Code § 147 and §§ 257-262 that were
allegedly committed in year t in a given municipality, divided by
the population size of the municipality and multiplied by 100,000.
40Variable Description
Vandalism The number of reported acts of vandalism as deﬁned in the
Norwegian Penal Code §§291-294 that were allegedly committed in
year t in a given municipality, divided by the population size of the
municipality and multiplied by 100,000.
Table A2. Additional speciﬁcation checks
Baseline No outliers No zeros No cities Incl. Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All sex crimes 1.217** 1.112** 1.299** 1.261** 1.922***
(0.533) (0.462) (0.555) (0.549) (0.737)
Rapes 0.401** 0.316** 0.359 0.432** 0.303
(0.164) (0.148) (0.248) (0.168) (0.224)
Child abuse 0.443 0.317 0.722 0.454 0.910*
(0.370) (0.300) (0.516) (0.382) (0.519)
First-stage:
Coveragek,t−1 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.103*** 0.128*** 0.127***





Note: Crime rates are calculated per 100,000 persons. Eﬀects are reported per percentage point
increase in the internet user rate. The baseline results are based on 422 municipalities × 8 years
= 3376 observations. In column (2), we check the robustness of our results to extreme values by
dropping all the observations with a value of the dependent variable higher than its 99.5th percentile.
In column (3), we drop all observations with zero values of the dependent variable, whereas we
drop the 5 largest cities in Norway, i.e. Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Kristiansand,
in column (4). Outcome variable in column (5) includes crime in neighboring municipalities. All
regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies and all controls listed in Table A1.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
41Table A3. Eﬀect of broadband internet expansion on sorting
Men Women
All 16–24 25–44 16–24 25–44
Entrykt 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Dependent mean 0.051 0.083 0.055 0.108 0.051
Exitkt -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Dependent mean 0.038 0.110 0.045 0.131 0.040
Note: Entrykt = # individuals moving into municipalily k in year t/ size municipality k in year
t. Exitkt = # individuals moving out of municipality k in year t / # similar individuals in
municipality k at the start of year t. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the municipality level. Regressions are based on 422 municipalities × 8 years = 3376 observations.
All regressions include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies.
42